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Abstract
Using results from evolutionary game theory, we analyze the conditions
under which guilt can provide individual fitness benefits to actors, and so
evolve. In particular, we focus on the individual benefits of guilty apology.
We find that guilty apology is more likely to evolve in cases where actors
interact repeatedly over long periods of time, where the costs of apology
are low or moderate, and where guilt is hard to fake.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is a branch of mathematics used to model the evo-
lution of strategic behavior in humans and animals. This framework is not
traditionally employed to understand the evolution of emotions because emo-
tions, simpiciter, are not behaviors. O’Connor (2016) argues, however, that the
enormous body of literature from evolutionary game theory on the evolution
of cooperation, altruism, and apology can be used to inform the evolution of
guilt by showing where and when guilt can provide individual fitness benefits to
actors. She also presents novel modeling work clarifying how guilt can benefit
individuals by prompting apology. In this paper, we extend O’Connor’s analysis
to analytic, rather than computational models. We also give further insight into
the conditions under which guilty apology can evolve.
In section 2 we describe the inferential strategy by which we use evolutionary
game theoretic results to provide insight into the evolution of guilt. We also
discuss O’Connor’s basic insights into the conditions under which guilt provides
individual fitness benefits to actors. In section 3 we present our evolutionary
model of guilty apology, and clarify conditions under which guilt is likely to
evolve to play this strategic role.
2 Evolutionary Game Theory and Guilt
Evolutionary game theoretic models involve two basic elements—games and
dynamics. Games, in the game theoretic sense, are simplified representations of
strategic interactions. Dynamics, on the other hand, specify how a population
of actors playing a game will change, or evolve. Which behaviors (or strategies)
in the game will become more prevalent as evolution progresses? Which will
disappear?
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Games, in evolutionary models, explicitly represent three things—players,
strategies, and payoffs. These correspond to the agents involved in an inter-
action, their possible behaviors, and what they get for their behaviors, respec-
tively. Note that there is no resource, here, for representing the emotional state
of an actor. Inasmuch as emotions in humans are causally connected to be-
haviors, however, we can use these models to gain insight into what functional
role emotions might play. Guilt, our focus here, is associated with three types
of behaviors in humans. First, the anticipation of guilt prevents social trans-
gression (Tangney et al., 1996). It is correlated, for this reason, with altruistic
and cooperative behavior in humans, as well as decreases in norm violation (Re-
gan, 1971; Ketelaar and Tung Au, 2003; Malti and Krettenauer, 2013). Second,
the actual experience of guilt leads to a suite of reparative behaviors including
apology, gift giving, acceptance of punishment, and self punishment (Silfver,
2007; Ohtsubo and Watanabe, 2009; Nelissen and Zeelenberg, 2009). Lastly,
expressions of guilt seem to lead to decreased punishing behaviors, and forgive-
ness, by group members (Gold and Weiner, 2000; Fischbacher and Utikal, 2013;
Eisenberg et al., 1997). If we find, in evolutionary models, that these sorts of
behaviors provide selective advantages to individuals, we identify a situation in
which guilt can provide a selective advantage as well. By dint of leading to
selected behavior, guilt is also selected.
O’Connor (2016) identifies three sets of evolutionary game theoretic results
that can inform the evolution of guilt. The first employs the famous prisoner’s
dilemma game to model the evolution of altruism, by which we mean any be-
havior in which an agent decreases their own payoff in order to increase another
agent’s payoff. In this literature, the mechanisms which have been identified
that can create individual level benefits for altruism are reciprocity and pun-
ishment.1 If one is in a group where actors can remember past actions and
reciprocate—by behaving altruistically towards altruists and selfishly towards
the selfish—altruism can be directly beneficial to the individual. Emotions that
promote altruism, such as guilt, are likewise beneficial. When actors punish
those who fail to behave altruistically, likewise altruism, and guilt, are directly
beneficial to the individual. Notably, human groups engage both in reciprocity
and in punishment suggesting that guilt will tend to provide a selective advan-
tage by preventing failures of altruism in these groups (Boyd et al., 2003; Boyd
and Richerson, 2009).
Secondly, in models that employ the stag hunt to represent mutually ben-
eficial, but risky, cooperation, guilt can benefit actors by stabilizing such co-
operative behavior. In these types of interactions, it always benefits actors to
cooperate when their partners do as well, even in the face of transient temp-
tation to do otherwise. An emotion, like guilt, that promotes cooperation will
then provide individual benefits to any actor in a generally cooperative group.2
1See Nowak (2006) for an overview of the evolution of altruism in the prisoner’s dilemma.
We do not address potential group-level benefits of guilt, here. For theoretical discussion of
such possible benefits of guilt, see Deem and Ramsey (2015); Ramsey and Deem (2015). Nor
do we address kin selection.
2See Skyrms (2004) for more on the stag hunt and the evolution of cooperation.
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Alexander (2007) shows that cooperation in the stag hunt is especially likely to
evolve in groups where the same actors tend to keep interacting.
Lastly, it has been observed that apology can benefit individuals playing
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma—a version of the game where the same actors
repeatedly are engaged in an opportunity for altruism. In this game, strategies
that reciprocate by refusing to behave altruistically towards selfish types can
do well, but they suffer a problem when faced with accidental bad behavior by
a partner. These strategies can become locked in a spiral of mutual negative
reciprocation, which hurts all involved. Actors who apologize, and accept the
apologies of group members, can gain an advantage in such conditions. These
apologies can work if they are costly (Okamoto and Matsumura, 2000; Ohtsubo
and Watanabe, 2009; Ho, 2012; Han et al., 2013), if they are unfakeable, or
if they combine elements of costly and unfakeable apology (O’Connor, 2016).
This indicates that the often costly apologies generated by the experience of
guilt may, paradoxically, provide individual fitness benefits in the long run by
convincing group members to accept guilty actors into the social fold after bad
behavior. In the rest of the paper, we present modeling results expanding and
supporting this claim.
3 Model and Results
A prisoner’s dilemma is a two-player game in which each player has two possible
strategies: “cooperate” and “defect”. If both players cooperate, they both get
a moderate payoff (2, in our model). If one cooperates and one defects, the
cooperator gets nothing (0) and the defector gets a large payoff (3). If they both
defect, they both get a small payoff (1). In other words, mutual cooperation is
preferable to mutual defection, but each player does best to defect regardless
of the other player’s choice. While we follow the literature in using the term
“cooperation” for the prosocial strategy, it is in fact a case of altruism because
players who choose it incur a cost and increase their partner’s payoff.
This game is a dilemma because the strategy pair where both players defect
is the only Nash equilibrium of the game—the only set of strategies for which no
player can benefit by switching. The expected outcome is then for both players
to defect, despite the fact that mutual cooperation is preferred by everyone.
In an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, as mentioned, agents repeat the prisoner’s
dilemma round after round with some probability, and as a result coopera-
tion can get a foothold in the game via reciprocation. One such reciprocating
strategy is called the “grim trigger”—players begin by cooperating, but if their
partner defects they immediately switch to defection for the rest of the inter-
action.3 In this way, they benefit themselves by cooperating with cooperators
and defecting with defectors.
3One can equivalently think of this probability, n, as encoding the average number of
rounds each encounter is expected to last, as this is given by 1
1−n . For example, if n = 0.95,
there will be an average of 20 rounds played.
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As described in the last section, this strategy runs into problems when play-
ers have a chance of accidentally performing the wrong action—defecting instead
of cooperating, or vice versa. Accidental defections causes grim triggers to per-
manently defect on good cooperative partners. Mutual negative reciprocation of
this sort is mutually damaging.4 In such an environment, an apologetic strategy,
which we call the “guilt-prone grim trigger”, or just guilt-prone, for short, can
outperform a punitive one. Guilt-prone players act as grim triggers, but apol-
ogize after accidental defection. Upon receipt of such an apology, they forgive
and forget, and so return to playing cooperate.
The problem with this strategy is that an apology will not effectively signal
guilt if defectors can use it to convince their partners to cooperate, even though
they intend to continue to defect. Another way of putting this is that guilty
apology might not be evolutionarily viable if “fakers” can take advantage of
forgiveness among guilt-prone players.
There are two lines of defense against such fakers. One is for guilty apolo-
gies to be unfakeable. This relates to arguments by Frank (1988) that moral
emotions, such as guilt, evolve as honest signals of cooperative intent in hu-
mans. Empirical evidence suggests that humans do trust signals of guilt from
group members to some degree when deciding whether to forgive and forget,
but that guilt, unlike some emotions, is not associated with stereotyped facial
and body postures (Deem and Ramsey, 2015). In other words, it is not entirely
unfakeable. For this reason, in our models we assume that guilt-prone types al-
ways manage to successfully apologize and fakers are still successful with some
probability.
Another way to discourage fakers is to impose a cost for apologizing. When
guilt-prone types apologize to each other, they are able to re-enter a poten-
tially long cooperative engagement where they both reap the benefits of mutual
aid. This means that the expected benefit to apologizing is high. When fakers
apologize, they defect the next round, necessitating another costly apology if
they wish to re-enter the social fold. This means that the benefit to fakers of
apologizing is a short period of defection, which yields a relatively small pay-
off.5 These differential benefits means that paying an identical cost will be less
worthwhile for fakers than guilt-prone types under many conditions.
Our models work as follows. We assume that a population of actors plays
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma where every round the game continues with
probability, n. Each round, there is a probability, a, that actors accidentally
perform the wrong action. The strategies in the population are cooperate un-
conditionally, defect unconditionally, grim trigger, guilt-prone, and faker. There
is some probability p ≤ 1 that fakers manage to signal their guilt. And in order
to successfully apologize, actors pay a cost. To allow for the possibility that
actually guilty types pay a lower cost than fakers to convince others of their
4O’Connor (2016) also looks at “tit-for-tat”, another reciprocating strategy. She finds
similar results in models that include it, instead of the grim trigger, although the analysis is
more complicated for various reasons.
5In some of the models we consider, stochastic effects mean that this benefit is slightly
higher or lower.
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guilt we define c ≥ d where c is the cost of apology for guilt-prone types and d
for fakers.6
3.1 When Can Guilt Evolve?
In this section we will address the conditions under which guilt-prone is an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). ESSes are strategies where populations
playing them cannot be invaded by a small number of actors using a different
strategy. It is also the case that for the replicator dynamics, the most commonly
used model of evolutionary change in evolution game theory, ESSes are stable.
If populations evolve to them, they stay there, absent other forces.7 For this
reason, ESSes are often likely to evolve.8
In the models we consider, unconditional defection is always an ESS. Guilt-
proneness is sometimes an ESS, though it can be destabilized by successful fakers
(who themselves are eventually replaced by defectors). As it turns out, the guilt-
prone strategy is evolutionarily stable against fakers in a sizable portion of the
parameter space. As indicated above, both higher cost, c, and lower probability
of fake apologies working, p, helps protect guilt-prone players against fakers.
For now, we will assume that c = d, or that both types pay the same cost for
apology.
In order for the guilt-prone strategy to be an ESS given a fixed error rate,
a = 0.01, and chance of repeat encounter, n, figure 1 shows that the harder an
apology is to fake, the cheaper the cost of apology needs to be. Alternatively, the
higher the cost, the less fakeable an apology needs to be. This figure also shows
that for some p, the guilt-prone strategy can be an ESS against fakers even when
the cost of apology is negative. Moreover, p doesn’t need to be small at all, nor
c large, in order for the guilt-prone strategy to be an ESS against fakers if n
is sufficiently large. Note that these figures only show conditions under which
guilt is stable against fakers—more on other strategies in a minute.
This graph also indicates that for larger n, guilt is stable under wider condi-
tions, i.e., with lower cost, c, and higher fakeability, p. This makes sense, since
the more rounds that are played on average, the more likely a guilt-prone player
is to reap benefits of long interactions with other guilty types, and the more
likely they catch on and disbelieve a fake apology, thus depriving the faker of
the benefits of defecting against a cooperator for the rest of the encounter.
An increase in the error rate, a, makes it marginally more difficult for the
6After choosing values for our parameters, we can generate a payoff table for each strat-
egy based on the expected outcome for playing an iterated prisoners dilemma under these
conditions. For the details of these calculations see Rosenstock (2016).
7ESSes are strategies that do better against themselves than other strategies do against
them. Or, if another strategy does equally well against an ESS, the ESS does better, when
they meet, than the strategy does against itself.
8They are not the only stable states under the replicator dynamics, and sometimes ESSes
are quite unlikely to evolve. Huttegger and Zollman (2013) discuss problems with ESS method-
ology as opposed to dynamical analyses. O’Connor (2015) discusses a particular example, the
evolution of learning, where ESS analysis is misleading. In the next section we will move to
a dynamical analysis for these reasons.
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Figure 1: Minimum cost, c, for guilt-prone to be an ESS vs. faker, for each
fakeability value p, error rate a = 0.01.
guilt-prone strategy to be an ESS against faking. This is because as a increases,
guilt-prone players accidentally defect and have to pay the apology cost more
frequently, and fakers are more likely to accidentally cooperate, thus delaying
their chances of getting caught. However, the effect of a is relatively minor
compared to the effects of p, c and n, especially where a ≤ 0.1, which we
consider a reasonable assumption.
One might also be interested in determining under which conditions the
guilt-prone strategy is an ESS versus other strategies. When not playing against
fakers, the parameter p no longer matters. Figure 2 shows the minimum n for
which the guilt-prone strategy is an ESS versus grim trigger, unconditional
cooperation, and unconditional defection when the error rate is a = 0.01. The
guilt-prone strategy is an ESS for most of the parameter space we’ve been
looking at, i.e., low costs and high chance of repetition. As a increases, n needs
to be a bit larger for the guilt-prone strategy to be an ESS, but little changes
in the ranges of n and c that we focus on. Note that in early human groups,
we expect n to be very high, meaning that guilt-prone should be an ESS under
these conditions.
3.2 The Robustness of Guilty Apology
We have now seen that guilt-proneness can evolve in order to promote costly
and/or honest apology. In this section, we will describe, in some greater detail,
the conditions under which guilt is likely to evolve for this function, or likely to
be stable if it does. ESS analyses are useful because they tell us something about
which strategies have the potential to evolve. Some ESSs, however, have very
small basins of attraction under the replicator dynamics. A basin of attraction,
for an equilibrium, is the set of population states that evolve to that equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Minimum likelihood of repeated encounter, n, for guilt-prone to be
an ESS against defectors, cooperators, and grim triggers, error rate a = 0.01.
The size of a basin of attraction can tell us something about the evolvability of
a strategy. Equilibria with large basins are more likely to evolve from a random
starting place. Also, mutations, or noise, in evolutionary processes can move
populations from one equilibrium to another. Equilibria with large basins of
attraction tend to be harder to disrupt, while those with small ones are easy to
move away from. In models explicitly representing this sort of noise, populations
tend to spend most of their time at equilibria with large basins of attraction.
We thus want to ask: under what conditions does guilt-proneness, as rep-
resented in our models, have a large basin of attraction? What are the factors
that make it likely to evolve and be stable for the purpose of promoting apol-
ogy? There are a few parameters to consider in answering this question. We
can ask what happens to the basin of attraction for guilt-proneness when we
vary c, the cost of apology for guilt-prone players, p, the probability that fakers
successfully trick others into trusting their apologies, and d, the cost of apology
for fakers.
Let us start with p. In models without fakers, guilt-prone types do very well,
because their apologies are trustworthy. Fakers can be thought of as siphoning
away the benefits of guilty apology. For this reason, holding other conditions
fixed, guilt-proneness has a larger basin of attraction whenever p is smaller. If
guilt is hard to fake, it is more likely to evolve.
The role of c and d, the costs for apology, are a little more subtle. First,
consider the case where c = d, or fakers and guilty types pay the same cost.
When p is low, guilt-prone types do well against fakers. For this reason, increas-
ing c actually makes guilt-proneness less likely to evolve. It simply decreases
the payoffs to guilty types, while failing to significantly help them differentiate
themselves from fakers. When p is higher, cost can help guilt-prone types. It
7
allows them to prove their cooperative intent, compared to faker types. Figure
3 shows the sizes of the basin of attraction for guilt-proneness, as opposed to
defection, in games where p and c vary, a = .01 and n = 0.95.9 The x-axis
tracks cost, c = d, which ranges from .005 to 1. The y-axis shows the likelihood
that guilt evolves. For p = 0.95, the optimal cost for the evolution of guilty
apology, of those explored, is 0.4. For p = 0.9, the optimal cost is 0.2. For the
smaller values of p, costs make guilt less likely to evolve.
Figure 3: Sizes of basin of attraction for guilt-prone strategy as c and p vary.
The other situation worth considering here is the one where d > c, or where
fakers must pay some greater cost to apologize. The idea is that their apologies
are less convincing and so social partners exact an extra cost before trusting
their apologies. Figure 4 shows basins of attraction for guilt in these models
with p held fixed at 0.95 and a = 0.01. Two data sets are pictured here. For
the first, c = 0—guilt-prone types pay no cost to apologize—and d ranges from
0.01 to 0.9. For the second, c = 0.2—a small cost for guilty apology—and d
ranges from 0.21 to 0.9. In both cases, increasing d, the cost to fakers, while
holding c fixed, increases the likelihood that guilt evolves. When there is a cost
for guilt, this generally decreases the likelihood it will evolve. Both these results
should be unsurprising, costs for fakers make faking a less successful strategy,
and stabilize guilt. Costs for guilty apology make guilty types less successful
and allow defection to evolve more often.
In all the results just shown, we hold a and n fixed. As in the ESS analysis,
variations in a, within a sensible parameter range, have little effect on outcomes.
9The basins of attraction were measured using the discrete time replicator dynamics. Re-
sults are from 10000 simulations run until the population was clearly converging to one of
the two rest points—all play guilt-prone, or all play defect. The strategies included were
unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, guilt-prone grim trigger, and faker.
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Figure 4: Sizes of basin of attraction for guilt-prone where d 6= c.
Variations in n have much more significant effects. For larger n, generally, guilt
proneness will be more evolvable. Also, adding other strategies can shift evolu-
tionary outcomes of these models significantly. If the grim trigger is included,
for example, it is also an ESS under many parameter values. For some parame-
ter values, the presence of this strategy increases the basin of attraction for guilt
proneness because it disproportionately hurts defectors and fakers. For other
parameter values, especially when costs are higher, grim trigger is so successful
itself that it decreases the basin of attraction for guilty apology. We do not
include a full analysis of models with grim trigger strategies for space reasons.
To sum up, the more difficult it is for faker types to convince social partners
that they truly feel guilt, the more stable and evolvable guilt (for the function
of apology) is. Costs to apology can help promote the evolution of guilt by
differentially harming guilty versus faker types, but these costs also come at,
well, a cost in terms of stability in the face of defection.
4 Conclusion
Results from evolutionary models indicate that there are many conditions that
can make guilt-proneness individually beneficial for actors. When it comes to
benefits to guilt before bad behavior, these include the presence of reciprocating,
or punishing group members, and the presence of established, mutually bene-
ficial patterns of cooperation. When it comes to benefits after bad behavior,
guilt can help actors if it allows for unfakeable apology, costly apology, or some
combination of the two of these. Guilt is particularly likely to evolve and be
stable for this function if it is harder to fake, either in the sense that group
members do not believe fake apologizers, or in the sense that they levy higher
costs to ensure the apologies of faker types.
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One might object that the models presented here do not explicitly represent
the role of culture in guilt. Culture seems likely to have played a role in the
evolution of guilt, and clearly plays a role in the production of guilt in modern
societies. We do not mean to downplay the importance of cultural elements
in the evolution of guilt. Nonetheless, the models here still provide insight in
that they clarify the conditions, whether cultural or environmental, under which
guilt, whether culturally produced or not, can provide a selective advantage and
evolve.
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